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Abstract
We develop a theory and empirical test of how the legal system aﬀects the relationship
between a venture investor and an entrepreneur. The theory uses a double moral
hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the
quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European
venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors
give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection, and they
develop more value-adding skills. These predictions are stongly supported by the
empirical analysis. We also find that the investor’s legal system is more important
that of the company in determining these eﬀects, and that legal system eﬀects persist
within civil law countries.
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1 Introduction
The work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) demonstrates the importance of the le-
gal system for economic activity. Their work, and a large ensuing literature shows that
countries with diﬀerent legal origins also systematically diﬀer in terms of their financial
systems. In this paper we ask how financial intermediation is aﬀected by the nature of
the legal system. A large theoretical literature has pointed to the importance of both
contractual and non-contractual aspects of financial intermediation when an entrepreneur
seeks funds for an investment project (Holmström and Tirole (1997), Hart (2001)). We
then look at how the entire relationship–contractual and non-contractual– between an
investor and an entrepreneur depends on the legal system.
Since it is not immediately obvious how the legal system should aﬀect this relationship,
we let our analysis be guided by theory. We examine how optimal contracts, and the
resulting investor behavior, depend on the legal system. We propose a simple theory that
makes three predictions. First, the better the legal system the more investors provide value-
adding support. Second, the better the legal system the more they demand contractual
downside protection in bad states of the world, using securities such as debt, convertible
debt, or preferred equity. The underlying intuition is that investing in support activities is
only worthwhile if the legal system provides investors with suﬃcient guarantees that these
eﬀorts will not be wasted. We also show that in a better legal system it is optimal to give
the entrepreneur stronger upside incentives. As a consequence it becomes necessary to give
investors additional cash flow rights on the downside, in order to satisfy their participation
constraint.
Our theory also considers how the legal systems might aﬀect financial intermediaries
themselves. We consider the influence of the legal system on intermediaries’ incentives to
develop the competencies necessary to provide value added services. Our third prediction
is that intermediaries from countries with a better legal system will provide more value
added services, even when investing abroad.
To test the predictions of the theory, we use a hand-collected dataset on European
venture capital investments for the period 1998-2001. We focus on venture capital as a spe-
cialized form of financial intermediation because prior research has already established the
richness of relationships between venture investors and their companies. Venture capital
firms can play a value-adding role in the companies they finance, both through contracting
and by providing non-contractible inputs such as advice, support, and governance (Bot-
tazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2006, 2007), Gompers (1995), Hellmann and Puri (2000,
2002), Hochberg (2003), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), Lerner (1994), Lindsey (2003),
Sahlman (1990), Sorensen (2006)). While this evidence mostly concerns the US, over the
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last decade venture capital has become a global phenomenon (Megginson (2004)), with
Europe becoming a particularly important market (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2004), Da Rin,
Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006)). As the venture capital industry develops, there is con-
siderable debate about whether diﬀerences in investment methods are related to diﬀerences
in legal systems. Europe is therefore an excellent place to examine the eﬀects of diﬀer-
ences across legal systems, since European countries are fairly comparable in their stages
of economic growth, yet there is a rich variety of legal systems within Europe.
Our sample consists of 1,431 venture deals from 124 venture capital firms in 17 Euro-
pean countries. Our primary data source is a comprehensive survey of all venture capital
firms in these countries. We then augmented the data with numerous secondary sources,
including commercial databases and websites. This data collection eﬀort required consider-
able time and eﬀort but allowed us to gather a dataset that has several unique advantages.
The dataset is considerably larger than other hand-collected datasets on venture capital,
and is much richer than the commercially available databases. It contains several mea-
sures of the interactions between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, which allows us to
assess both the contractual and the non-contractual aspects of their relationship. These
measures cannot be obtained from standard sources of venture capital data (such as Ven-
turExpert), nor from venture capital contracts. Another notable feature of the dataset is
that it provides us with investments which cross over to diﬀerent legal systems, involving
investors from both better and worse legal systems. Both these empirical features are new
to the literature.
We find strong empirical support for our theoretical predictions. Better legal systems
are associated with more investor involvement and more downside protection for the in-
vestors. The results hold for legal origin, using the standard interpretation that the Anglo-
Saxon common law system is better for investors than systems based on civil law. They
also hold for two widely used index measures of the quality of the legal system: the rule
of law and the degree of legal procedural complexity.
Our data also allows us to examine whether the eﬀects of legal systems come through
the company or the investor. This issue had not yet been fully explored by the literature.
We provide a novel approach which enables us to establish the greater importance of the
investor’s legal system eﬀects. Consistent with our model, investors from countries with
stronger legal protection provide more support and demand more downside protection.
This supports our theoretical prediction that the legal system aﬀects financial outcomes not
only directly, but also indirectly by aﬀecting the extent to which financial intermediaries
develop competencies.
Much of the literature uses diﬀerences between common and civil law countries to
identify the eﬀect of the legal system. Our data allows us to go one step further, and
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perform some additional, more detailed, tests by focusing on diﬀerences within civil law
countries. We find that our results continue to hold in the subsample of civil law companies
and investors, thus providing a stronger case for the importance of legal systems.
Our results provide new insights into how legal systems aﬀect financial intermediation.
In particular, they point to the importance of considering the relationship between investor
and entrepreneur in its entirety, accounting for the interdependence between contractual
and non-contractual aspects. Moreover, the analysis shows how the legal system works
its eﬀects beyond contracts and investors’ actions, coming to aﬀects investor competen-
cies themselves. The findings have important implications for our understanding of cross
country diﬀerences in financial intermediation. We discuss these implications, and their
relevance for policy, in the main body of the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the relationship with the lit-
erature. Section 3 develops the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the data. Section
5 discusses the empirical results, and Section 6 provides some further discussion. It is
followed by the conclusion.
2 Related Literature
A few theoretical papers have begun to explore the relationship between legal systems
and corporate finance choices. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) examine a model where an
entrepreneur wants to divert funds for private use. They show how the strength of the legal
system aﬀects the willingness to go public, and thus the equilibrium size of the capital
market. Burkhart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) consider how the legal system aﬀects a
manager’s ability to divert funds. They show that the willingness of an owner to delegate
control to a manager and to sell shares to outsiders depends on the quality of the legal
system. In a related vein, Burkhart and Panunzi (2004) consider the eﬀect of shareholder
protection on managerial incentives, monitoring and ownership concentration. Bergman
and Nicolaievski (2004) develop a model where the quality of the judicial systems drives the
quality of enforcement. We are not aware of any theory paper that specifically addresses
the role of the legal system for the non-contractual aspects of financial intermediation.
Our theory examines the relative use of debt and equity as a function of the quality
of legal systems. It seems natural to relate this to the literature on cost state verification
(Gale and Hellwig (1985)), which has argued that debt is an optimal instrument when the
cost of verifying (and thus enforcing) state-contingent returns is high. This line of argument
would suggest that debt is more important in poorer legal systems. However, upon closer
inspection, this line of argument does not really apply to the context of venture capital,
which is fundamentally about equity investments. We are looking at a context where the
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legal system is suﬃciently advanced to allow for state-contingent returns and thus the use
of equity. Put diﬀerently, the question we are asking here is not whether equity investors
want to switch to debt, but whether equity investors want to add some debt. One of the
interesting insights that we obtain from the model is an explanation why this incremental
use of debt might actually be associated with better legal systems.
Because the theoretical literature remains under-developed, much of the empirical liter-
ature has focused on documenting empirical regularities. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998), examine the eﬀects of legal systems on financial or economic outcomes, providing
evidence on the link between legal origin, financial institutions and company growth. Qian
and Strahan (2005) look at how legal origin aﬀects the design of bank loan contracts.
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2002) examine the eﬀect of investor protection on firms’
cost of capital. Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2005) examine the relationship between legal
systems and firm dynamics, including entry and exit rates.
Of particular relevance here are two recent papers based on venture capital data. Lerner
and Schoar (2005) (LS henceforth) collect a sample of 210 transactions in 26 countries,
made by 28 private equity firms, mostly between 1996 and 2001. They focus not purely
on venture capital deals, but on private equity deals more broadly defined. Their data
are mainly from developing, rather than developed countries, and their analysis is mainly
based on comparing common and civil law countries (as well as former socialist systems).
Among other things, they find that in countries with better legal systems, private equity
investors switch from using simple securities, notably straight equity and debt, to using
more sophisticated securities, such as convertible preferred stock.
Kaplan, Martel, and Strömberg (2003) (KMS henceforth) collect a sample of 145 ven-
ture deals made by 70 venture capital firms in 107 companies in 23 non-US (largely Euro-
pean) countries, mostly between 1998 and 2001. They compare these non-US investments
with the US sample analyzed by Kaplan and Strömberg (2003). Their main dependent
variables focus on contractual sophistication. Among other things, they find a positive re-
lationship between better legal systems and the use of convertible securities. Their central
finding, however, is that the coeﬃcients for legal systems become insignificant after con-
trolling for investors’ sophistication. They measure sophistication by whether the investor
is US-based or has experience investing in the US venture capital market.
Our study advances the literature on several counts. First, we develop a theoretical
model that gives us a coherent framework for explaining how the legal system aﬀects
the entire financing relationship, in terms of contracts, non-contractual actions and even
investor competencies. Second, we are able to empirically examine the non-contractual
dimension of the venture capital relationship. This component of value-adding support
has been central in much of the theoretical venture capital literature, but has not yet been
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studied empirically. Third, an interesting diﬀerence is that the prior literature identifies
legal system eﬀects mainly by comparing the US (and the UK to a limited extent) with a
number of civil law countries, whereas our sample consists entirely of European investors
and companies. The US is undoubtedly the leading venture capital market, implying that
legal system eﬀects could be confounded with US-specific eﬀects, especially due to leader-
follower market dynamics. In our analysis we are also able to examine the eﬀects of legal
systems in the subsample of civil law countries only. Fourth, our analysis provides a novel
approach for comparing the relative importance of the companies’ versus investors’ legal
system. The prior literature focuses mostly on companies’ legal systems and finds mixed
result.1 Our analysis suggests that company legal system eﬀects are not as robust as
investor legal system eﬀects. This is an important and novel finding that also suggests
new directions for future research.
Fifth, we use a new data approach. KMS and LS gather private equity and venture cap-
ital contracts. This has the advantage of providing very detailed data on the contractual
relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. We choose a complemen-
tary approach of gathering survey data on venture capital activity. This has the advantage
that we can go beyond the purely contractual aspects of the investment relationship. It
also allows us to build a substantially larger sample than LS and KMS.
There are many similarities between our results and those of LS and KMS. For example,
all three papers find that the use of convertible preferred securities is associated with better
legal systems. However the are also some diﬀerences.
In LS company legal eﬀects remain significant throughout, whereas in this paper their
significance vanishes once we control for the investor’s country. Note that one of the ad-
vantages of having a much larger sample size is that it allows us to estimate models with
country fixed eﬀects. Another diﬀerence between this paper and LS concerns the rela-
tionship between legal systems and the use of pure debt. LS find a negative relationship,
whereas we find a positive relationship. The most likely explanation is sample diﬀerences,
in particular the kind of investments found in the relatively poorer legal systems. In LS,
those investments are largely made by non-venture private equity investors, who invest in
traditional sectors such as manufacturing, and who provide capital for expansion or buy-
outs. The invested companies are likely to have significant assets and therefore a higher
debt capacity. By contrast, in our sample investments are largely made by venture cap-
italist, who invest in early-stage, high-technology companies with relatively few assets.
Moreover, note that in the sample of LS companies face severely underdeveloped banking
1Both LS and KMS contain one table where they add a dummy for whether the investor is from a
common or civil law country. In both papers this simple dummy variable turns out to be statistically
insignificant, and both papers then refrain from further investigating investor legal system eﬀects.
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system, where the provision of standard bank loans cannot be taken for granted. Their
equity investors may have to fill an additional market gap that is not present in our sample.
Similar to KMS, we also find that company legal system eﬀects become insignificant
once we control for enough investor characteristics. One subtle diﬀerence is that in our
setting we need to use investor country fixed eﬀect to render company legal system eﬀects
insignificant, whereas KMS only use measures of investor sophistication. In our setting
investor sophistication, as measured by US or international investing experience, turns
out to be relatively less important. However, we find that another measure of investor
sophistication matters, namely the distinction between independent and captive venture
capitalists, which is not pursued by LS or KMS. This finding also contributes to the
literature on strategic investors (Gompers and Lerner (2000), and Hellmann, Lindsey and
Puri (2005)).
3 Theory
The main objective of the theory is to motivate the empirical analysis and provide a con-
ceptual framework for understanding the main empirical results. Therefore, we deliberately
use a set-up that is as simple as possible. The model is a simplified version of the double-
moral hazard model which has become the workhorse of the theoretical venture capital
literature (Casamatta (2003), Cestone (2004), Hellmann (1998, 2004), Inderst and Müller
(2003), Repullo and Suarez (2004), Schmidt (2003)). The main novelty of the theory is to
introduce the quality of the legal system into the double moral hazard model.
3.1 Assumptions
Consider an entrepreneur who requires an investment amount kV to start a company. The
entrepreneur is wealth constrained and her opportunity cost of doing the venture is given
by kE . With probability (1− p) the company is a failure, and it is unable to generate any
cash flows. Still, the company will have some assets, that have a value a. For simplicity
we assume that assets cannot be stolen.2 With probability p, the company is a success,
generating additional cash flows π. (@@@ THOMAS, YOU HAD THE FOLLOWING,
THAT WAS CLEARLY A HALF-BAKED REVISION, I WOULD JUST DROP THE
WHOLE OF IT: The problem is that some of them may be their verifiability depends
on the legal system). We assume that investors’ claims on π are legally enforceable with
probability λ, so that λ measures the quality of the legal system. With probability 1− λ
the entrepreneur identifies a weakness in the legal system that allows her to divert the
2This assumption simplifies the exposition. It is easy to verify that it does not aﬀect any of the results.
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cash flows π to her pockets. Stealing is risky or otherwise costly, so that the entrepreneur’s
expected returns from stealing are given by (1− φ)π, where φπ measures the net cost of
stealing.
For the double moral hazard problem, we use a tractable specification, where the
probability of generating additional cash flows is given by
p = p0 + pEe+ pV v.
Let e measure the non-contractible eﬀort of the entrepreneur, and v measure the amount
of non-contractible value-adding support of the venture capitalist. For simplicity we use
quadratic private eﬀort costs cE = e2/2 and cV = v2/2. The parameters pE and pV measure
the relative importance or ability of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist. Throughout
we assume that p0, pE and pV are suﬃciently low to ensure that p < 1.
In this simple model, the value of the company can only take two values: a+ π on the
upside, and a on the downside. The venture capitalist’s cash flow rights are linear, so that
w.l.o.g. they can be expressed as a combination of debt and equity. Let d denote the face
value of debt, and s the venture capitalist’s equity share. The venture capitalist receives
d+ s(a− d) on the downside and d+ s(π + a− d) on the upside.
For φ > s the entrepreneur would never want to steal, since the cost of diverting funds
is greater than the cost of sharing. We focus on the non-trivial case where φ < s, so that
the entrepreneur always prefers stealing over sharing. Define:
Λ = λ+ (1− λ)(1− φ)
so that Λ represents the fraction of total returns that are not lost due to appropriation by
the entrepreneur. Let uE , uV denote the utilities of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist,
and u the joint utility, then:
uE = (1− s)(a− d) + pπ(Λ− λs)− cE
uV = d+ s(a− d) + pπλs− cV
u = a+ pπΛ− cE − cV
For simplicity, we assume that the venture capitalist has all the bargaining power, but
relax this assumption in Section 3.4. The optimal contract maximizes uV by choice of d
and s, subject to uV ≥ kV , uE ≥ kE (where kV is the venture capitalist’s opportunity
cost of the investment) and subject the two incentive compatibility constraints derived in
section 3.2.
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Three remarks on the model assumptions are of order at this point.
(@@ NOTE: THIS PARA INCLUDES LAURA’S EDITING) First, note that λ repre-
sents legal system characteristics of both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. From
a legal point of view, both company and investor jurisdictions matter, as both influence
contracting. The variable λ does not try to decompose the two legal system eﬀects, since
a priori we cannot tell which jurisdiction is more relevant. We leave that challenge to the
empirical analysis.
Second, the parameter pV measures the value-adding competencies of venture capital-
ists. At the time of investment, these can be taken as exogenous. However, venture capital
firms can also make decisions about how much they want to develop value-adding compe-
tencies. We can therefore think of pV as being set at some prior date, before the venture
firm engages in deals.
Third, we noted above that the optimal contract can always be expressed in terms
of debt and equity. This does not mean that investors are restricted to use those specific
securities. Indeed, as we will discuss in the empirical analysis, venture capitalists often use
convertible preferred equity. For simplicity’s sake, the theoretical model does not try to
distinguish between these alternative securities (see Hellmann (2006) for a detailed analy-
sis). Instead, the model focuses on the more general trade-oﬀ between upside incentives
and downside protection, which can be implemented either with a combination of debt
and equity or with convertible preferred securities.3
3.2 Optimal contracts
To focus on non-trivial cases we assume that it is always possible to satisfy the two partic-
ipation constraint. We obtain the two incentive constraints from the first-order conditions
of maximizing uV w.r.t. v, and uE w.r.t. e:
e = pEπ(Λ− λs) and v = pV πλs (1)
Increasing s increases v and decreases e, so that equity aﬀects incentives. Interestingly,
v and e are independent of d. This means that debt only transfers utility between the
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. Put diﬀerently, in this simple model, downside
protection gives the venture capitalist additional cash flow rights without aﬀecting the
balance of incentives. Hellmann (2006) shows that even in a much more general setting,
downside protection plays a similar role.
3To see this more formally, note that we can map convertible preferred equity into the model as follows.
Let ?d denote the face (or preferred) value before conversion, and ?s the percentage equity stake after
conversion. We then have ?d = d+ s(a− d) and ?s(a+ π) = d+ s(π + a− d) ⇔ ?s = s+ (1− s)d
a+ π
.
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The optimal choices of d and s depend on whether or not the entrepreneur’s wealth
constraint is binding or not. Figure 1 shows the utility frontier for the entrepreneur and
venture capitalist. Its shape is standard for the double moral hazard model with wealth
constraints. If the entrepreneur receives a relatively high utility uE (which is necessary for
high values of kE), then the utility frontier consists of a 45-degrees line. The entrepreneur’s
wealth constraint is not binding, and the two parties can implement a jointly optimal
contract that we denote by s∗ and d∗ (derived below). Since debt constitutes transferable
utility, the venture capitalist can increase his utility by increasing d, up to d = a. Because
the entrepreneur is wealth constrained, to further increase his utility, the venture capitalist
can only increase s above s∗. This reduces the entrepreneur’s eﬀort level, which is ineﬃcient
and causes the utility frontier to slope at an angle less than −45◦ for lower levels of uE.
For very low levels of uE , the utility frontier may even bend backwards. In this case the
venture capitalist takes excessive equity (i.e., s > s where s corresponds to the peak of
the utility frontier). The entrepreneur provides very little eﬀort, to the point that the
venture capitalist is worse oﬀ himself. In equilibrium the venture capitalist will never oﬀer
a contract on the backward bending part of the utility, but instead choose s at the peak
of the utility frontier.
For brevity’s sake, we derive the results when the wealth constraint is not binding
in the main text, and deal with that case in the Appendix. In the absence of a wealth
constraint, the optimal value s∗ maximizes the joint utility u. The first-order condition for
s∗ is given by:
πΛ(pE
de
ds
+ pV
dv
ds
)− ede
ds
− vdv
ds
= 0
Using (1), we can solve for s∗. After some transformations we obtain:
s∗ =
Λ
λ
p2V
p2E + p
2
V
(2)
Clearly, s∗ is larger the larger the venture capitalist’s value contribution (pV ), and the
smaller the entrepreneur’s value contribution (pE). The following lemma considers the
eﬀect of λ on s∗.
Lemma 1 The venture capitalist’s optimal share s∗ is decreasing in λ.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is that a better legal environment redistributes rents from
the entrepreneur to the venture capitalist. In a double moral hazard setting, this upsets
the balance of incentives. The optimal contract addresses this by allocating a lower share
of equity to the venture capitalist. It is interesting to note that Lemma 1 is empirically
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supported by LS, who find that venture capitalists hold larger equity stakes in countries
with weaker legal protection.
Using (2), the equilibrium eﬀort levels are given by:
e∗ =
p3E
p2E + p
2
V
Λπ and v∗ =
p3V
p2E + p
2
V
Λπ (3)
With this we examine the provision of value-adding support.
Proposition 1 (Support) The optimal level of value-added support v∗ is increasing with
the quality of the legal system λ, i.e.,
dv∗
dλ
> 0.
Proposition 1 yields a first testable implication, that there is a positive relationship
between the quality of the legal system, and the support provided by venture capitalists.
One might wonder whether the greater support by the venture capitalist comes at the
expense of a lower eﬀort by the entrepreneur. This is not the case, since in fact
de∗
dλ
> 0.
Because there is less diversion of cash flow, less value is wasted, and therefore it is possible
to write an optimal contract that generates more eﬀort by both the venture capitalist and
the entrepreneur. Closely related to that, note that Figure 1 also shows the eﬀect of the
legal system on the utility frontier.
Next, we assess how the equilibrium level of debt d∗ depends on λ.
Proposition 2 (Downside) The optimal level of debt d∗ is increasing with the quality
of the legal system λ, i.e.,
dd∗
dλ
> 0.
The proof is in the Appendix. Proposition 2 yields a second testable implication, that
in a better legal system the optimal contract places more emphasis on giving the venture
capitalist additional downside protection. A priori, it is not immediately clear how the
quality of the legal system might aﬀect downside protection. The intuition for proposition
2 is as follows. In a better legal system, it is harder for the entrepreneur to divert funds.
Since appropriating cash flows provided incentives to the entrepreneur, it now becomes
necessary to give the entrepreneur more incentives in terms of a greater equity stake. This
leaves less equity for the venture capitalist, as shown in Lemma 1. The venture capitalist
therefore needs to extract any additional value through stronger downside protection.
Hence d∗ is an increasing function of λ.
In the Appendix we also consider the case where the wealth constraint is binding.
Proposition 2 no longer applies, since a binding wealth constraint implies d∗ = a, which
does not depend on λ. However, both Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 continue to apply in
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the model with wealth constraints, including the case where the venture capitalist chooses
the peak of the utility frontier.
3.3 Optimal competencies
So far, we have taken the competencies of the venture capitalist as given–in line with
the extant literature. However, the legal system can also aﬀect the venture capitalist’s
competencies. We can ask whether venture capitalists that operate predominantly in a
better legal environment also have stronger incentives to develop value-adding competen-
cies. This will provide a theoretical basis for empirically examining an investor “home
eﬀect.”
Each venture capital firm has an exogenously given home country and develops com-
petencies in line with its expected deal flow. This can be characterized by a probability
distribution Ω over the types of entrepreneurs that it expects to invest in. Entrepreneurs
may diﬀer in terms of all model parameters. Let the vector x summarizes all these deal
characteristics, namely p0, pE, kE, kV , π and a. Ω(λ, x) therefore describes the distribution
of entrepreneurs not only in terms of x, but also in terms of λ. We capture the notion
of an investor’s home eﬀect as follows. We assume that an investor located in a better
legal system sees a deal flow with a higher proportion of deals with high λ. Formally, we
equate a better domestic legal system with a first-order stochastic dominant shift of the
distribution of λ, holding x constant.
In our model, the value-adding competencies of the venture capitalist are represented
by the support parameter pV . We assume that the cost of developing competencies is given
by a convex cost function CV (pV ). Each venture capitalist then maximizes his own utility,
given by: UV =
R
uV (λ, x)dΩ(λ, x)− CV (pV ).
Proposition 3 (Investor home eﬀect)
(i) The better the legal system, the more a venture capitalist develops competencies.
Formally, pV is increasing for any first order stochastic dominant shift of λ.
(ii) For a given λ, the eﬀect of increasing pV is always positive for on the amount
of venture capital support v∗, although the eﬀect on the optimal amount of debt d∗ is
ambiguous.
The proof is in the Appendix. Proposition 4 consists of two parts. Part (i) shows
that in better legal environments venture capital firms have greater incentives to develop
value-adding competencies. Intuitively, competencies are more valuable if the legal system
is good. Formally, the proof shows that the marginal benefit of developing competencies
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is increasing in λ. Part (ii) shows that, within a given legal system, venture capitalists
with higher competencies provide more support. Whether or not they also ask for more
downside protection, however, is ambiguous. Proposition 4 implies that in a given country
there are systematic diﬀerences between domestic and foreign investors. If the foreign
investors come from a better legal system, they are likely to provide more support.
3.4 Further discussion
Our model assumes that venture capitalists have all the bargaining power. Relaxing this
does not aﬀect Propositions 1 and 3, but it may aﬀect Proposition 2. In the Appendix,
after the proof of Proposition 2, we consider the generalized Nash bargaining solution,
where the venture capitalist’s bargaining power β can take any value between zero and
one. For suﬃciently low equilibrium values of d∗, the positive relationship between optimal
debt (d∗) and the quality of the legal system (λ) continues to apply for all values of β.
For higher equilibrium values of d∗, we show that there exists a value bβ (with 0 < bβ < 1),
such that the d∗ decreases in λ for β < bβ and increases for β > bβ. Thus, while our theory
suggests a positive relationship between the legal system and the level of debt for a large
range of parameter values, we cannot rule out a negative relationship for some parameter
values.
The model uses a simple specification of returns, where there are only two states: the
upside and the downside. It is easy to see that adding a third state, where the venture is a
complete failure with all assets being worthless, while maybe adding some realism, would
not change any of the results. More generally, Hellmann (2006) shows that the intuitive
results from a model with two states carry over to a much more general specification of
returns.
We model the quality of the legal system in term of the probability of stealing λ.
An alternative interpretation of the model is to think of λπ as the amount of cash that
is verifiable, and can thus be allocated between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist.
The entrepreneur is able to steal an amount (1− λ)π, but incurs a cost of stealing φ(1−
λ)π. This generates identical payoﬀs for the venture capitalist (πλs) and entrepreneur
(π(Λ−λs)), implying that the analysis continues to apply. This alternative interpretation
has the attractive feature that it makes stealing a continuous as opposed to probabilistic
variable. One technical limitation, however, is that it requires linearity of contracts as an
assumption.4
4 In the probabilistic interpretation, there are only two outcomes, so that linear contracts are always
optimal. The interpretation with continuous stealing has an additional complications that the venture
capitalist could oﬀer an artificial non-linear contract that discourages stealing. Specifically, the contract
would give the entrepreneur her share allocation (1 − s) whenever profits are exactly π, but nothing if
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Finally, for simplicity we have assumed that the cost of stealing φ) is a constant. As
λ increases, it is possible that φ increases, i.e., dφ/dλ ≥ 0. It is straightforward to show
that our results continue to hold as long as Λ is increasing in λ, i.e., dΛ/dλ ≥ 0. This
latter condition is very intuitive, as it merely says that a better legal system has fewer
ineﬃciency losses (which is almost tautological).
4 The Data
In this Section we discuss the sources and nature of our data. We want to point out that
the European venture capital markets is a useful setting for testing our model. European
countries are broadly comparable in terms of their stages of economic development. The
European venture capital market has matured considerably throughout the 1990s, growing
in size and in its ability to invest in innovative companies with a potential for high-growth
(Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002), Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006)). And Europe has
a remarkable variety of legal systems, so that we have several countries for both common
and civil law countries, and countries with diverse levels of the legal indices.
4.1 Sources of data
Our data come from a variety of sources. Our primary source is a survey that we sent to
750 venture capital firms in the following seventeen countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. This set of countries includes all the
members of the European Union in the period under study, plus Norway and Switzerland.
We contacted venture firms that satisfied three conditions: (i) in 2001 they were full
members of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) or of a national venture
capital organization, (ii) they were actively engaged in venture capital, and (iii) they were
still in operations in 2002.
We deliberately excluded private equity firms that only engage in non-venture private
equity deals such as mezzanine finance, management buy-outs (MBOs) or leveraged buy-
outs (LBOs).5 However, we did include private equity firms that invest in both venture
capital and non-venture private equity deals. For these, we considered only their venture
capital investments.
profits fall short of π. This non-linear contract is largely an artifact of simplifying model assumptions,
and bears no resemblance to real world securities. The alternative interpretation of stealing continuous
amounts remains attractive as long as one is willing to impose linearity.
5See Fenn, Liang and Prowse (2003) for a discussion of how the venture capital market is structure in
two diﬀerent segments, ’venture capital’ and ’non-venture private equity.’
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We collected our survey data between February 2002 and November 2003. We asked
venture capital firms about the investments they made between January 1998 and De-
cember 2001. The questions centered on key characteristics of the venture firm, on the
involvement with portfolio companies, and on some characteristics of these companies.6
The survey asked respondents a substantial amount of detailed company-level information.
We also asked information on the educational background and work experience of each
venture partner.
We received 124 responses with various degrees of completeness. Of these, three ven-
ture firms had been formed in 2001 but had not yet made any investments, so we do not
include them in our sample. We contacted all the venture firms that had sent us incom-
plete answers, and attempted to complete them whenever possible. As a further step, we
augmented the survey data with information from the websites of the respondents and
their portfolio companies. We also turned to commercially available databases: Amadeus,
Worldscope, and VenturExpert. We use information from these databases for two pur-
poses. First, they allow us to obtain missing information, such as the dates, stages, and
amounts of venture deals. Second, we use these databases to cross-check the information
obtained from respondents. Such cross-validation further enhances the reliability of our
data. Overall, we obtain data on 1,652 deals made by 119 venture firms. Unlike other pa-
pers, we refrain from using data from additional rounds that an investor makes in a given
company. That is, we restrict our data to the first investment made by the investor in the
particular company. In the main body of the paper we focus the analysis on investments
within Europe (we discuss this further in section 5.4). We thus drop also investments in
non-European countries; as a result, our sample consists of a total of 1,428 deals. Moreover,
our sample includes 51 investors who invest abroad, in a total of 190 foreign deals.
Can we assess the quality of our sample relative to the underlying population? Other
papers in the literature avoid this question, because it is extremely diﬃcult to gather in-
formation on the population. Unlike banks, venture capital firms are not heavily regulated
and do not need to disclose information. To gather data on the population of 750 Euro-
pean venture capital firms, including those that did not respond to our survey, we used
two sources, the commercial database VenturExpert, and the statistics published by the
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA). We also made a substantial attempt to
collect additional data through direct phone calls and through websites and other trade
publications. With considerable eﬀort, we were able to gather information on more than
two thirds of the population.
This additional data allows us to perform several checks on how well our sample repre-
6Throughout the paper we reserve the term ’firm’ for the investor (i.e., the venture capital firm) and
the term ’company’ to the company that receives venture financing.
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sents the population of European venture capital firms. First, we look at how the sample
fares in spanning the underlying population. Table 1 compares the sample with the pop-
ulation it is drawn from. Panel A looks at the country composition. While there is some
variation in response rates across countries, our data represent a comprehensive cross-
section which provides a good coverage of all countries. No single country dominates the
response, and no country is left out. Most notably, our sample performs well in terms of
including firms from the larger venture capital markets: France, Germany, and the UK all
have response rates above 13%. The overall response rate of nearly 16% is larger than for
comparable surveys of industrial firms, as discussed by Graham and Harvey (2001).7
Panel B looks at the structure of both sample and population in terms of organizational
types. We partition the sample into independent, bank, corporate, and public venture
capital firms. As we show in Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2006), diﬀerent types of
venture firms behave diﬀerently, and we want to make sure that our results are not driven
by the sample composition. Our sample closely reflects the distribution of types in the
population.
Panel C compares the size distribution of our respondents with that of the population.
We consider two possible size measures: the number of partners, and the amount under
management, both measured at the end of 2001. For the sample and the population the
mean and median values of partners virtually coincide. The amount under management
includes all funds managed by venture capital firms, including those invested in non-
venture private equity. The average firm size is larger for the population, due to the fact
that several large private equity firms, that invest mainly in non-venture private equity,
chose not to respond to our survey. Consistent with this, the median firm size is very
similar for the sample and the population.
Another notable strength of our data is it does not rely on a few venture capital firms.
Indeed, the single largest venture capital firm accounts for only 5% of the observations,
and the largest five venture capital firms for only 16% of the observations.
We also examine whether our respondents report only part of their portfolio, especially
if they tend to report their more successful deals. We address this concern in three ways.
First, in late 2003 we checked the websites of all respondents. When we exclude 15 venture
firms whose website did not list portfolio companies, we find that the portfolio companies
reported to us were over 90% those listed on the websites. Since two years had elapsed from
the closing of our sample, and new investments had naturally been made, we conclude that
our sample covers well over 90% of all deals, suggesting that it is unlikely that our sample
suﬀers from systematic under-reporting. Second, we compare the exit rates for our sample
with the oﬃcial statistics of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), which
7The typical response rate for such surveys is about 9%.
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classifies as exits IPOs, mergers and acquisitions. We made an additional data collection
eﬀort and obtained exit outcomes for all of our companies, using the same classification
(see Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2006) for details). We find that 24.7% of companies
in our sample had a successful exit rate over the period 1998-2005, By comparison, we
count from EVCA all investments and exits over the same period and find an exit rate of
25.6%. It therefore appears that our sample is not biased towards more (or less) successful
companies. Third, we also consider the possibility that there may be reporting biases in our
data. Respondents might choose not to answer all of our questions about their activities
when their companies are not performing well. To see whether our data present any such
bias, we performed some additional tests. For all of our dependent variables we correlate
the exit rate with the response rate. We find that all the correlation coeﬃcients are all
below 6%. We also estimate (unreported) Probit models to see whether the exit rate might
explain reporting rates after controlling for other observable characteristics. Naturally, we
can only control for those characteristics for which we have complete or near-complete
reporting, namely investor characteristics and company sectors. We find that the exit rate
is statistically highly insignificant. These results suggest that there is no reporting bias
towards more successful companies.
4.2 Data Variables
In this Section we discuss how we construct our variables, whose formal definitions are
given in the Variables Definition Section of the Appendix.
4.2.1 Dependent variables
In this paper we focus on how the legal system aﬀects the activities of venture capitalists
and their interaction with portfolio companies. Led by our theoretical model, we concen-
trate on two diﬀerent dimensions of the venture process: value-adding support and the
choice of securities. In the Appendix we provide formal definitions of these variables
The role of value-adding support (Proposition 1) has also become a central theme in
venture capital research (Cassamatta (2003), Hellmann (2000, 2002), Cestone (2004)). For
support we use a measure of the amount of interaction, looking at the reported frequency
with which a venture capitalist is in contact with the company. This is a useful sum-
mary measure of the amount of time and eﬀort that the venture capitalist spends on the
company.
INTERACTION is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital firm
is reported to interact with the company on a monthly or weekly basis; 0 if it interacts with
on an annual or quarterly basis. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
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asked: How many times per year does (did) the responsible partner(s)/manager(s) person-
ally interact with this company? (check one). Possible answers were: annually; quarterly;
monthly; weekly.
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) explain that while venture capitalists use a variety of
securities, many of these perform equivalent functions. Of central importance is how the
entire package of securities aﬀects the distribution of cash flows rights, and especially
to what extent the venture capitalist gets his returns on the upside as compared to the
downside (Proposition 2). In an ideal scenario, we would be able to gather complete data on
the allocation of cash flows rights, including all term sheets and valuations. However, since
such data is extremely sensitive, and since our aim was to gather a large and representative
dataset, we deliberately limited our inquiry. We collected data on the types of securities
used, but not on the specific term sheets or valuations.
In our survey we asked about the entire set of securities used for each deal. This
question allowed for multiple responses. Since we consider this data of interest by itself,
Table 3, Panel B, tabulates, by legal system, the types of securities used in our dataset.
We clearly see that the use of securities varies across legal systems.
To move beyond a mere description of the securities used, we leverage our theory.
Proposition 2 predicts that the optimal amount of debt, d∗, is increasing in λ, and Lemma
1 shows that the optimal amount of equity held by the venture capitalist, s∗, is decreasing
in λ. This implies that the better the legal system, the more the optimal contract places
emphasis on downside protection.
While our data does not allow us to measure the exact values d∗ and s∗, we can
construct proxy variables for the relative importance of downside protection. For this we
use the data from Table 3. We refer to straight debt, convertible debt and preferred equity
as ‘downside securities,’ since they all give the venture capitalist a larger stake on the
downside.
DOWNSIDE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal includes at least
one downside security, and 0 otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument,
which asked:Which of the following financial instruments has your firm used to finance this
company? Possible answers were: common equity; straight debt; convertible debt; preferred
equity; warrants.8
In order to probe further into Proposition 2, we use information from our survey in-
strument to build an alternative aggregation of securities into the following three variables:
CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal
8 In the instructions to the survey we specified functional definitions of these diﬀerent financial instru-
ments in order to ensure consistency of responses. For example, our definition of convertible debt includes
convertible preferred debt, which is a security often used in venture deals (see Kaplan and Strömberg
(2003) .
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includes convertible debt or preferred equity, and 0 otherwise.
DEBT is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal includes straight debt,
and 0 otherwise.
EQUITY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal includes common
equity, and 0 otherwise.
4.2.2 Independent variables: legal origin and legal indices
We distinguish among three groups of independent variables.
Our first group of independent variables concerns the legal system of companies and
investors. We employ three alternative measures of the quality of the legal system. Legal
scholars classify national legal systems according to the legal origins of the commercial
code. La Porta et. al. (1998) propose two main categories: legal systems with common law
origin and legal systems with civil law origin; the former category includes Anglo-Saxon
common law, while the latter includes French civil law, German civil law and Scandinavian
civil law. We construct dummy variables that classify our companies according to these
two categories, using civil law as the default category.
An alternative approach of classifying legal systems is to use more specific indices,
which measure some aspects of the legal system. We use two standard indices: the rule of
law and the procedural complexity index (see the Appendix for their formal definitions).
These two indices relate directly to our concept of the ’quality’ of enforcement in a legal
system. In our model the parameter 1 − λ measures the probability with which an en-
trepreneur can steal from her company without the investors detecting him. We look for
empirical counterparts of this concept.
La Porta et. al. (1998) provide a detailed explanation of the rule of law index, which
measures the quality of legal enforcement. Their index is based on data for the early
1990s. Since enforcement evolves over time, we use a version of the rule of law index which
measures the quality of enforcement in the year 2000 and is published by the World Bank.
Our second index measure of the quality of the legal system is the index of procedural
complexity, which measures the degree of legal formalism, by averaging the cost, length of
time and number of steps necessary to perform two simple legal operations: recovering a
bounced cheque and evicting a tenant. This index is discussed at length in Djankov et al.
(2002) and is published by the World Bank’s ’Doing Business’ project.
In order to make our results more easily readable, we adopt a linear transformation of
the procedural complexity index so that a higher value indicates less complexity. That is,
we have an index of ’procedural simplicity,’ so that higher index values represent better
(i.e., procedurally simpler) legal systems.
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4.2.3 Independent variables: venture firm and company variables
Our second set of independent variables captures investor-level and deal-level eﬀects. Build-
ing on Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2006), we focus on the following eﬀects:
INDEPENDENTVC, is a dummy variables that takes the value 1 if the venture cap-
italist defines itself as an independent venture capital firm; 0 otherwise. We obtain the
data from our survey instrument, which asked: Would you define your firm as (check
one): Independent venture firm, Corporate venture firm, Bank aﬃliated venture firm or
Other (specify).9
VCSIZE is the amount under management of the venture capital firm at the end of
the sample period (2001), in millions of current euros. We obtain the data by contacting
directly respondent companies after receiving their main answers. For those firms for
which we had not received the information directly we gathered the data from commercial
databases, company websites and industry sources.
VCAGE is the age of the venture capital firm, measured in months at the end of the
sample period. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Indicate the
date of creation of your firm (mm/yy). For those firms for which we had not received the
information directly we gathered the data from commercial databases, company websites
and industry sources.
Following KMS we consider the importance of international experience in venture
investing, and build the following variables:
VC-US-EXPERIENCE is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the venture capital
firm has invested in at least one US company.
INTERNATIONALVC is the share of a venture capital firm’s investments made abroad.
Building on results by Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2006), who show that partners’
experience is an important determinant of venture investors’ activism, we also look at the
experience of individual venture partners, and build the following variables:
PARTNER-US-EXPERIENCE is the fraction of the venture firm’s partners who have
prior experience as venture partners in the US.
PARTNER-BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE is the fraction of the venture firm’s partners
who have prior business experience in industry or consulting. We obtain the data from
our survey instrument, which asked (for each partner): Indicate the professional back-
ground (multiple answers possible): finance; industry (including previous entrepreneurial
experience); accounting; consulting; legal; other (specify).
9 We carefully examined the three respondents which checked the ’other ’ category. One is a public
university fund, and was classified as public; another is a family-controlled fund, and was classified as
independent; the third is a fund owned by a a government company which engages in financing for small
businesses, and was classified as public.
19
Our final set of variables captures the eﬀects of deal-level characteristics.
STAGE is an ordered variable that takes values 1 to 4 if a deal is reported as seed, start-
up, expansion or bridge. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked:
Indicate the type of your first round of financing to this company (check one). Possible
answers were: Seed; Start-up; Expansion; and Bridge.
INDUSTRY is set of a dummy variables that we obtain the data from our survey
instrument, which gave the following choices: Biotech and pharma; Medical products; Soft-
ware and internet; Financial services; Industrial services; Electronics; Consumer services;
Telecom; Food and consumer goods; Industrial products (incl. energy); Media & Entertain-
ment; Other (specify).
Table 2, Panel A, contains descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.
The number of observations diﬀers across regressions because of missing values for some
of the variables. We discuss this further in Section 6. Table 2 Panel B, shows the means
(or frequency) of our main dependent and independent variables across legal origins.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Main eﬀects
We are now in a position to empirically test our theoretical propositions. Our empirical
base regression is as follows:
Yic = Legal ∗ β1 +X 0iβi +X 0cβc + εic
where i indexes investors and c indexes companies. The dependent variables Yic measures
for investor i in company c the level of INTERACTION or DOWNSIDE. We use an ordered
Probit model for INTERACTION, and a simple Probit model for DOWNSIDE, X 0i is a
vector of investor characteristics (INDEPENDENTVC, VCSIZE and VCAGE), and X 0c is
a vector of company characteristics (STAGE and INDUSTRY). Since our data consists
of multiple investments made by diﬀerent venture capital firms, we cluster our standard
errors by venture capital firms. This allows for the error term εic to be correlated within the
deals made by a venture capital firm, and imposes a conservative standard for accepting
statistically significant results. Clustering also implies the use of heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors. Finally, Legal is a legal systems measure (legal origin, rule of law index, or
procedural simplicity index), and we examine these both from the company’s and investor’s
perspective. Because of multi-collinearity we use the standard approach in the literature
and refrain from estimating jointly the eﬀects of company and investor legal systems–i.e.,
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we do not employ company and investor indices, nor diﬀerent types of indices, in the same
regression.
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix among the main dependent and independent
variables. We note that both INTERACTION and DOWNSIDE are positively correlated
with all of the legal system indices, at statistically significant level. We will return to some
of these correlations later.
Univariate correlations are informative, but they obviously do not control for other
company and investor eﬀects. In terms of company characteristics, we control for industry
and stage. In terms of investor characteristics, we control for the age and size of the venture
capital firm. Our prior research (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2006)) also shows that an
important factor is whether a venture capital firm is organized as independent or captive.
Independent venture capital firms are conceived as specialized organizations, whose sole
purpose is to maximize profit. Captive venture capital firms are investment vehicles that
are used by established companies, banks, or the government, to achieve both profits as
well as broader strategic goals (Hellmann (2002), Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri (2005)).
We therefore also control for whether a venture capital firm is independent or not.
Table 4 reports our empirical base model. Panel A examines the eﬀect of legal systems
on the INTERACTION variable, Panel B on the DOWNSIDE variable. We find that the
legal system has a strong eﬀect on both of these outcome variables. All coeﬃcients are
positive and statistically significant, most of them at the 1% level. The estimates also
appear to be economically large. For example, the probability of downside protection is
31% higher for a common law company than for a civil law company and the probability
of frequent interactions is 20% higher.10 For the rule of law index, we find that, relative to
a French company, a UK company’s probability of downside protection by 17% higher and
the probability of frequent interactions is 23% higher. The procedural index regressions
produce similar magnitudes.
Whether a venture capital firm is independent or captive has a very strong eﬀect. The
coeﬃcient for independent venture capital is positive and statistically significant at the 1%
level for INTERACTION and 5% for DOWNSIDE. Obtaining finance from an indepen-
dent venture firm raises the probability of frequent interaction by 15% and of downside
protection by 20%. This is an interesting result by itself, confirming and extending some of
the prior findings on the distinction between independent and captive venture capital. It
is also interesting to note from Table 3 that independent venture capital itself is positively
correlated with the legal indices. In unreported regressions we confirm that this univariate
correlation continues to hold in a multi-variate regression that also controls for company
10To calculate the economic eﬀect for the interaction variable, which is a categorical variable, we create a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if interaction is ’frequent’ (i.e., monthly or weekly), and zero otherwise.
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characteristics (stage and industry). This suggests that in addition to the direct eﬀect of
the legal system, there is a complementary indirect eﬀect: in better legal systems, venture
capitalists are organized more often as independent entities, which then have more interac-
tion with their portfolio companies and ask for more downside protection. Note also that
we can think of the organizational choice as an investment in competencies as modeled in
Section 3.3. In better legal systems, it is more worthwhile to adopt an organizational form
that has a comparative advantage at interacting with entrepreneurs and providing them
value-adding support.
The other variable that is statistically significant is the age of venture capital firms.
We find that older firms are less interactive with their entrepreneurs, but they ask for
more downside protection. The prior literature sometimes interprets firm age as a proxy
for quality or even investor sophistication (see, for example, Sørensen (2006) and Gompers
et al. (2005)). We caution against placing specific interpretations on age coeﬃcients, given
that age can stand for a wide variety of eﬀects.
5.2 Company versus investor eﬀects
The analysis so far establishes the importance of the legal system. However, it does not
yet allow us to say whether the company’s or the investor’s legal system matters more.
Conceptually it is not clear which of those two eﬀects should dominate. From a legal point
of view both company and investor jurisdiction matter. While the company’s country of
incorporation is obviously important, investors can still use their own legal jurisdiction to
protect some aspects of their investments. Indeed, legal experts point out that in practice it
is often diﬃcult to clearly delineate jurisdictional responsibilities, and that both investor
and company jurisdictions influence contracts. @@@ reference!@@. From an economic
point of view, one may add that contractual (as well as non-contractual) practices ought
to be influenced by company characteristics, but that investor experience, capabilities and
expectations should also matter. Since there is no clear conceptual answer, the question
naturally lends itself to empirical examination.
We propose a new method of disentangling company and investor eﬀects that is based
on comparing two sets of fixed eﬀect regressions. The first set of regressions uses fixed
eﬀects for the investor’s country. This provides a powerful way for controlling for all aspects
that relate to the investor’s country, including its legal system. Controlling for this, we
examine whether the company’s legal system still retains its statistical significance. If we
find that it remains significant, then we have strong evidence that it matters. If it becomes
insignificant, however, we can argue that the company’s legal system is actually irrelevant,
once investor country characteristics are accounted for.
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This first set of regressions probes into the eﬀects of the company’s legal system but
does not speak to the importance of the investor’s legal system. For this, we use a second
set of regressions, which simply reverse roles. That is, we use a complete set of company
country fixed eﬀects and then examine whether the eﬀects of the investor’s legal system
retain any statistical significance. This second set of regressions does not yield insights into
the importance of company’s legal systems, but provides us with a powerful test for the
importance of the investor’s legal system eﬀects. Combining the insights from these two
sets of regressions thus provides a comprehensive assessment of the relative importance of
the legal system of companies and investors.
Table 5 shows the results of this approach. As before, Panel A reports regressions for
INTERACTION and Panel B for DOWNSIDE. The first three columns report the results
for the model with investor country fixed eﬀect. They inform us about the importance
of the company’s legal system. The last three columns report the results for the model
with company country fixed eﬀects, showing the importance of the investor’s legal system.
The results are strikingly clear. After controlling for investor-country fixed eﬀects, the
estimates for the company’s legal system become all statistically insignificant. In contrast,
the estimates for the investor’s legal system retain their size and statistical significance.
This patterns is true both for the INTERACTION and DOWNSIDE regressions.11 We
believe this is a new and important result. It shows that in order to fully understand the
eﬀect of legal systems, looking at the company’s legal system is not enough, and possibly
misleading. Our results show the greater importance of investor rather than company
eﬀects of the legal system.12
The remainder of this Section looks at a number of extensions. Because of the clear
message of Table 5, from now on we omit the discussion of companies’ legal systems
variables and focus our attention on the eﬀects of investors’ legal systems.
5.3 Simple versus sophisticated securities
The analysis so far looks at a summary measure of downside protection. In Section 3 we
already noted that there exist alternative ways of implementing downside protection. One
way is to use simple debt. A more sophisticated method involves the use of convertible
11@@@@@@ The only exception is in column 4 of Panel A, where the significance level dips to @%.
12 Instead of using fixed eﬀects for the countries of the companies or investors, one might also wonder
about using fixed eﬀect for the companies or investors directly. In our data we only observe a single investor
for almost all of our companies, which precludes the use of company fixed eﬀects. However, we have multiple
company observations for almost all of our investors, so that we can use investor fixed eﬀect. The results of
this approach are hardly surprising. Table 7 already shows that using investor-country fixed eﬀect renders
all the legal systems variables insignificant. Going to a finer-grained specification with individual investor
fixed eﬀects does not alter this conclusion.
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securities. Our parsimonious theory does not try to distinguish between those two types,
but a prior literature explains the advantages of such convertible securities (see , in par-
ticular, Hellmann (2006) and Schmidt (2003)). Moreover, the empirical work of LS and
KMS focuses on the distinction between simple versus sophisticated contractual features.
A natural question in our context is thus whether legal systems have a diﬀerential impact
on the use of simple versus sophisticated securities.
Our data on securities is not as detailed as that of LS and KMS, but it still allows
us to distinguish between two types of downside protection: simple debt versus more
sophisticated securities such as convertible debt or preferred equity. Moreover, we can
also look at which securities are used to allow investors reaping substantial benefits on
the upside, distinguishing between the use of straight equity and of more sophisticated
securities such as preferred equity or convertible debt. For this part of the analysis we use
the variables CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED, DEBT and EQUITY, whose construction
is described in Section 4.
Using these variables, we separately estimate the base model of Table 4 and the com-
pany country fixed eﬀect model of Table 5. The results are reported in Panels A, B,
and C of Table 6. The eﬀects of the investor’s legal system continue to be positive in all
the regressions for CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED (Panel A) and for DEBT (Panel B).
The significance levels are somewhat lower, with some coeﬃcients being only marginally
insignificant.
A closer look reveals an interesting pattern. To investigate whether a simple security
like debt may be a substitute of more sophisticated securities like convertible debt and
preferred equity for implementing downside protection, we estimate an additional regres-
sion model not reported here. We re-run the regressions of Panel of Panel A of Table
6 comparing deals with convertible preferred only against deals that also use debt. We
find that all legal variables are statistically insignificant, consistent with the notion that
debt and convertible preferred securities might be substitutes for implementing downside
protection.13
Panel C extends the analysis to upside gains, looking at the use of simple equity. Here,
all the legal measures have a negative and significant coeﬃcient: in better legal systems
investors switch from simple equity to more sophisticated convertible preferred securities,
consistent with the prior results of KMS and LS. In a similar way as for debt, we re-run
the regressions of Panel C comparing deals with convertible preferred only against deals
that also use equity. We find that all legal variables have a statistically significant negative
13We also estimate the regressions from Panel A excluding all the deals that use debt. We find that all
legal measures have a positive, statistically significant eﬀect. This suggests that if we take out debt, which
as a substitute acts as a confounding factor, then we re-establish a clear relationship between legal systems
and downside protection via more sophisticated securities.
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eﬀect. While a simple security like debt is a good substitute for sophisticated securities for
securing downside protection, the role of the legal system makes sophisticated securities
more appealing than simple equity for realizing upside gains.
Overall, the results of Table 6 suggests that the main eﬀect of a better legal system is
the increased use of downside protection. To achieve this downside protection, simple debt
and more sophisticated convertible securities appear to be close substitutes. The situation
is diﬀerent on the upside, however, as investors in better legal systems make greater use
of convertible securities rather than simple equity.
5.4 Within civil countries eﬀects
The literature on legal systems is often focused on the distinction between common and
civil law countries. This is clearly an important distinction, but it is interesting to note
than even among civil law countries, there might be considerable variation in the quality
of the legal system (Djankov et. al. (2002)). @@@ a better reference? @@
Our data allow us to extend our analysis and look at the diﬀerences among civil law
countries (see La Porta et. al. (1998)). There are three groups of civil law legal systems:
the French, the German and the Scandinavian system. To examine such diﬀerences, we
consider only the subsample of companies in civil law countries that receive financing from
civil law venture capital firms. We use the rule of law and procedural complexity indices
to measure the quality of the investor’s legal system.
Table 7 reports the results of our regressions, which include investor legal system eﬀects,
with and without company country fixed eﬀects. The measures of legal system quality
remain statistically significant for the INTERACTION variable, suggesting that for non-
contractible actions, the legal system continue to matter even with the subset of civil law
countries. In the DOWNSIDE regressions we find that the legal system coeﬃcients remain
positive, but are now statistically insignificant. This suggests that the distinction between
common and civil law countries is particularly important for the choice of securities, while
diﬀerences within civil law legal systems do not matter much.
However, when we re-run the (unreported) regression models where we compare the use
of simple versus sophisticated securities, we find that the legal system matters also within
civil law countries. In particular, we find exactly the same pattern as before, whereby debt
is a close substitute of convertible debt and preferred equity on the downside, while a
better legal system encourages the use of these sophisticated securities over simple equity
to reap upside benefits.
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5.5 Additional investor eﬀects
Our analysis emphasizes the importance of investors’ legal system. As with any empirical
analysis, there is a concern about unobserved factors. In this section we examine whether
legal system eﬀects cannot be explained by other investor characteristics. In the next Sec-
tion we also discuss the robustness of our results using additional company characteristics.
Of particular relevance for us is the question of whether we have properly accounted for
other investor characteristics, especially relating to their experience with investing across
diﬀerent countries. KMS, for example, argue that investment styles are strongly influenced
by whether investors have previous invested in the US.
We therefore consider a number of additional investor characteristics. First we look
at investors’ prior investment experience, and report the results in Table 8.14 Following
KMS, we measure whether a venture capital firm has made any US investments. When we
re-run the investor legal system regressions of Table 5, we find that adding this variable
does not aﬀect the significance of any of our legal system coeﬃcients.
We then consider not just a venture firm’s US investment experience, but whether
it has any experience with investing outside of their own countries more generally. Since
our country fixed eﬀect identification strategy relies on foreign investments, we want to
control for the possibility that internationally-oriented venture capitalists may have dif-
ferent investment styles than domestically-oriented venture capitalists. When we separate
out the eﬀect of internationally-oriented venture firms we find that all but one of the
legal system coeﬃcients remain positive and statistically significant.15 The direct eﬀect
of the internationally-oriented investor variable itself is statistically significant on the use
of DOWNSIDE protection, but it has a positive coeﬃcient that is not statistically for
the INTERACTION regressions. This evidence that internationally-oriented investors are
interactive is interesting in its own sake; however, it does not alter the main conclusion
about the importance of investor legal systems.
Second, our data allow us to go beyond investment experience. Since we have data on
individual partners, we may ask whether the professional experience of individual venture
partners matters, and report the results in Table 9. Specifically, we can look precisely at US
venture capital experience, not just any other US professional experience, and we examine
what proportion of partners in the firms has some prior venture capital experience in the
US. Again, when we re-run our regressions with partners’ venture experience in the US,
we find that all of the legal system coeﬃcients remain positive and statistically significant.
14For brevity’s sake, in Tables 9 and 10 we only report estimates of regressions models which include
company country fixed eﬀects. Tables without fixed eﬀects are available upon request.
15The exception is the fixed eﬀect regression of INTERACTION, where the coeﬃcient of COMMONVC
remains positive but becomes statistically insignificant.
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The direct eﬀect of partner-level US experience is positive and highly significant in both
INTERACTION and DOWNSIDE regressions. This is consistent with KMS findings of
strong US experience eﬀect.
As a final robustness check we use the insights from Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann
(2006), who find that an important attribute of venture capital firms is the proportion of
partners that have prior direct business experience from working as managers in industry
or consulting. When we include this variable in our regressions, we find that all of the
legal system coeﬃcients remain positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the direct
eﬀect of prior industry experience is not statistically significant. @@@ Do we want to
mention/report/use this? If not: condense T.8 and 9 and delete the weic row in table 2
(both panels) @@@
We conclude that even after subjecting them to a series of additional controls, the
investor legal system variables remain statistically significant. This increases our confidence
in the main result of the importance of investors’ legal systems.
6 Further Discussion
In this paper we develop a simple theory for how legal systems aﬀect venture capital ac-
tivities. When we take the model to the data, we find considerable empirical support. The
model thus provides a simple and intuitive explanation for the empirical findings. Natu-
rally, one may still wonder whether there are complementary or alternative explanations
for our empirical results.
One important question is whether the legal system matters because it forbids investors
to take certain actions (or write certain contracts), or because it influences, possibly in
more subtle and indirect ways, what investors prefer to do–along the lines of our model.
We can address this question in our context by asking whether certain investor actions,
such as providing value-adding support or asking for downside protection, are actually
precluded by the legal system. The first five rows of Panel B of Table 2 tabulate our
dependent variables across the four legal systems. While there are clear diﬀerences in the
relative frequency of these activities, there are no cells with 0% or 100%. This shows that
none of the legal systems preclude venture capitalists from doing these activities–a result
also corroborated by LS. We can therefore reject one important alternative interpretation
of our results–that the legal systems matters because it simply doesn’t allow investors to
take certain actions.
Our analysis focus on three main measures of the quality of the legal system–legal
origin, the rule of law, and procedural complexity. Other indices have been used in the
literature. One such index that is worth mentioning is the ’self-dealing’ index recently col-
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lected by Djankov et. al. (2005). At first glance, this index seems relevant to our analysis,
since it tries to measure how easy it is for insiders to steal cash flows. However, in our con-
text the index also has two drawbacks. First, it has been explicitly built for publicly-listed
companies, whereas our analysis deals exclusively with privately-held companies. Second,
the discriminatory power of the index stems mostly from the diﬀerence between common
and civil law countries; for the civil law countries within our sample the index shows very
little variation. Still, if we repeat our analysis using the self-dealing index, we find that
our results continue to hold. @@@ CHECK OUT THE ISSUE OF MULTICOLLINEAR-
ITY - WHAT FOLLOWS IS CORRECT IN MODELS WITH NO COUNTRY FIXED
EFFECTS, OTHERWISE THE INDEX IS DROPPED (AS IN THE CASE OF FULL
DATASET AS WELL). The only exception occurs when we restrict the analysis to the
subsample of civil law countries, where we no longer find the predicted relationships. We
attribute this to the relative lack of variation in the self-dealing index for those civil law
countries.
We have used a rule of law index developed by the World Bank that is widely used
in the economics literature. Still, we want to check that our results do not depend on the
nature of this particular index. To this purpose, we reran our regressions using an update
version of the rule of law index adopted by LaPorta et. al. (1998), which is published in
the International Country Risk Guide produced by the Political Risk Services Group. We
obtain qualitatively very similar results.
As with any empirical analysis, there is always a question about whether we have
controlled for enough other eﬀects. With hand-collected data, there is an additional trade-
oﬀ that adding variables comes at a cost of loosing observations. Our base specification
focuses on a few important investor and company characteristics. We did several additional
checks to see whether other variables aﬀect our results.
Our base model controls for the stage of the deal and the sector the company operates
in. Instead of using stage, we use the closely related (and correlated) measure of company
age, and obtain analogous results.
One concern might be that our sample period includes the “dotcom” period. Although
still over-hyped, the dotcom wave was much smaller in Europe than in the US. Nonetheless
we ask whether time periods aﬀect our results. Adding a set of year dummies does not aﬀect
our results. It might also be argued that the dotcom period involved software deals that do
not fit the traditional notion of a high-tech deal. When we drop all deals in the Internet and
software industry we lose 30% of the observations but our results are virtually unchanged.
A further concern is that our results are driven by diﬀerences across countries in terms
of stage of development. Though our sample consists of rather homogeneous countries in
this respect, we include in our regressions the per-capita GDP level of the venture capital
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firm’ country; we repeat this exercise using the GDP of the portfolio company’s country.
None of our results is aﬀected.
Another deal-related concern is that venture capitalists may assume diﬀerent roles,
depending on syndicate structures. Specifically, one might worry that lower levels of in-
volvement in foreign deals are due to the investor not assuming the lead investor role. For
the deals where we have the data, we include two additional controls, one for whether a
deal is syndicated, and one for whether the investor is the lead syndicator. Again we find
that this does not aﬀect our results.
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) note that the size of an investor’s stake aﬀects his
incentive to be involved with the company. While we do not have data on equity stakes,
we do have some data on the amount of money invested. First, we consider the total amount
of money that a venture capitalist invests in the deal. Second, we consider what percentage
of the total money raised in the round is provided by our investor. Both variables are likely
to be correlated with the equity stake, and their inclusion does not aﬀect our results.
We also did some robustness checks on our dependent variables. In the construction
of our downside measure we have used the information on the entire set of securities used
to finance a deal. In our survey we also asked which security was the most important in
the deal, i.e., we asked what the main security used was. We make use of this additional
information and modify our downside measure to include only the main security used. We
use this ’exclusive’ measure in our regression and find no change in the results.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a theory of how the legal system aﬀects optimal contracts,
investor involvement, and their incentives to invest in value-adding competencies. Testing
the theory on a hand-collected dataset of European venture capital deals, we confirm
the model predictions. The evidence shows how the legal system aﬀects not only the
contractual, but also the non-contractual aspects of the financing relationship. We show
that more than the company’s legal system, it is the investor’s legal system that matters.
Moreover, the eﬀect of the legal system operates not only directly through individual
contracts and actions, but also more broadly by aﬀecting the way financial intermediaries
develop their own skills and capabilities.
These results show that the law and finance literature can gain new insights by adopt-
ing a wider perspective. Most of the existing empirical studies focus on understanding
how the law determines contractual choices. We hope that our examination of the non-
contractual aspects provides a stimulus for further work on how legal systems aﬀects
financial intermediation more broadly.
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Our evidence on the importance of legal systems for the structure of venture capital
relationships also has important policy implications. The US has been widely touted as the
leading example of a modern venture capital industry. As policy makers from around the
world have strived to emulate the US model, they have frequently encountered numerous
problems. Indeed, in the European context, there has been a lively debate about the
feasibility and desirability of imitating the US venture capital model. Our theoretical and
empirical analysis clarifies the limits of this imitation process. Many countries may want
to foster US-style venture capital, but they rarely have in place a comparable legal system.
We provide evidence that investors endogenously choose diﬀerent investment styles. In the
absence of reforms that strengthen the legal system, blind imitation of US venture capital
practices is therefore unlikely to succeed.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
For the case where the wealth constraint is not binding, we simply take the derivative of
v∗ w.r.t. λ and find
dv∗
dλ
=
p3V φπ
p2E + p
2
V
. The wealth constraint becomes binding whenever
kE < uE(s∗, d = a). For such values of kE , the venture capitalist always sets d = a, and
then maximizes uV = a+pπλs−cV , subject to uE = pπ(Λ−λs)−cE ≥ kE and subject to
the first order conditions e∗ = pEπ(Λ−λs) and v∗ = pV πλs. We use the following change
of variable S = λs. We have e∗ = pEπ(Λ−S). v∗ = pV πS and p = p0+p2Eπ(Λ−S)+p2V πS,
so that after further transformations we obtain
uV = a+ p0πS + p2Eπ
2S(Λ− S) + p
2
V π
2S2
2
uE = p0π(Λ− S) + p2V π2S(Λ− S) + p2Eπ2
(Λ− S)2
2
We note that
duV
dS
= p0π+p2Eπ
2Λ−(2p2E−p2V )π2S. If 2p2E ≤ p2V , then
duV
dS
≥ 0 for all values
of S. In that case, the utility frontier is never backward bending. If 2p2E > p
2
V , then we
obtain the maximal level of equity, denoted by S, from
duV
dS
(S) = 0⇔ S = p0 + p
2
EπΛ
2p2Eπ − p2V π
.
Thus s ≡ 1
λ
p0 + p2EπΛ
2p2Eπ − p2V π
. If s > 1 ⇔ S > λ, then duV
dS
≥ 0 for all relevant values of S.
In that case, the utility frontier is also never backward bending. For s < 1 ⇔ S < λ, the
venture capitalist never chooses S > S, since that puts him on the backward bending part
of the utility frontier. For kE < uE(S), the venture capitalist thus always chooses s = s.
This characterizes the utility frontier.
Consider now the case with a binding wealth constraint, so that S > Λ
p2V
p2E + p
2
V
but
S < S. The optimal choice of S, denoted for simplicity by S∗, satisfies uE(S∗) = kE . It
is easy to verify that uE(S∗) is decreasing in S∗, and increasing in Λ and thus λ. Totally
diﬀerentiating uE = 0 we obtain
duE
dS∗
dS∗ +
duE
dλ
dλ = 0 ⇔ dS
∗
dλ
= −duE
dλ
/
duE
dS∗
> 0. From
v∗ = pV πS∗ it follows that
dv∗
dλ
> 0, which confirms Proposition 1. Finally, consider the
case where kE < uE(S). In this case, the venture capitalist always chooses the peak of the
utility frontier. Using v∗ = pV πS we immediately note that
dv∗
dλ
=
pV p2Eπφ
2p2E − p2V
> 0, which
again confirms Proposition 1.
Note also that Lemma 1 continues to apply when the wealth constraint is binding. To
see this, we note that
duE
dλ
∼ duE
d(Λ− S) < 0 since
d(Λ− S)
dλ
= φ−s < 0. Clearly, duE
ds
< 0.
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Thus
ds∗
dλ
− duE
dλ
/
duE
ds∗
< 0. Finally, note that
dS
dΛ
> 0, but
ds
dλ
=
1
2p2Eπ − p2V π
d
dλ
(
p0
λ
+
p2Eπ
Λ
λ
) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
We note that d∗ is determined by uE(d∗) = (1− s)(a− d∗) + pπ(Λ− λs)− cE − kE = 0.
Totally diﬀerentiating w.r.t. λ we obtain
duE
dλ
+
duE
dd∗
dd∗
dλ
= 0 ⇔ dd
∗
dλ
=
1
1− s
duE
dλ
. We
have
duE
dλ
=
∂uE
∂λ
+
∂uE
∂s∗
∂s∗
∂λ
+
∂uE
∂e∗
∂e∗
∂λ
+
∂uE
∂v∗
∂v∗
∂λ
. Using
∂uE
∂λ
= pπ(φ − s), ∂uE
∂s∗
=
−(a− d∗)−λpπ, ds
∗
dλ
= − p
2
V
p2E + p
2
V
1− φ
λ2
= −s∗ 1− φ
λΛ
,
∂uE
∂e∗
= 0,
∂uE
∂v∗
= pV π(Λ−λs) and
dv∗
dλ
=
p3V
p2E + p
2
V
φπ = pV s∗
λ
Λ
φπ we obtain
duE
dλ
= pπ(φ−s) +(a−d∗)s∗ 1− φ
λΛ
+pπs∗
1− φ
Λ
+p2V (Λ − λs∗)s∗
λ
Λ
φπ2. The second and fourth terms are always positive. The first and
third term can be combined as
pπ
Λ
[Λφ−Λs∗+s∗−φs∗]. Using 1−Λ = (1−λ)φ we obtain
pπ
Λ
[Λφ+(1−λ)φs∗−φs∗] = pπφ
Λ
[Λ−λs∗] > 0. It follows that duE
dλ
> 0 and thus
dd∗
dλ
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i): Consider first the case without a binding wealth constraint. Note that in
equilibrium we have uE = kE, so that uV = u−kE, yielding
duV
dλ
=
du
dλ
. We use the optimal
values e∗ = pEπ(Λ−λs) and v∗ = pV πλs to obtain u = a+(p0+p2Eπ(Λ−λs)+p2V πλs)πΛ
−(pEπ(Λ− λs))
2
2
−(pV πλs)
2
2
. From the envelope theorem we have
du
ds∗
= 0. Thus,
duV
dpV
=
du
dpV
= pV π2λs(2Λ− λs) > 0. We have thus established that uV is increasing in pV . The
optimal level of pV is determined by
R duV
dpV
dΩ(λ, x) = C 0V . To see how this depends on
the distribution of λ, we simply note that
d2uV
dpV dλ
= 2Λφ
p2V
p2E + p
2
V
(2− p
2
V
p2E + p
2
V
) > 0. The
marginal benefit of investing in pV is thus an increasing function of λ. If follows that the
optimal choice of pV is always higher for any first order stochastic dominant shift with
respect to λ.
For the case where the wealth constraint is binding, we only need to verify again that
d2uV
dpV dλ
> 0. To see this, we note that sign(
d2uV
dpV dλ
) =
d2uV
dpV dΛ
. Using the expressions of uV
and uE from the Proof of Proposition 1, we have
duV
dpV
= pV π2S2, so that sign(
d2uV
dpV dλ
) =
sign(
dS
dΛ
). We then use uE(S,Λ) = kE to obtain
dS
dΛ
=
duE
dΛ
/(−duE
dS
). From the above
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expressions, we immediately see that
duE
dΛ
> 0. Moreover,
duE
dS
< 0 is guaranteed for all
S ≥ S∗ = Λ p
2
V
p2E + p
2
V
.
Part (ii): We evaluate the comparative statics of v∗ and d∗ w.r.t. pV . From v∗ =
p3V
p2E + p
2
V
Λπ we note that
dv∗
dpV
=
3p2V p
2
E + 5p
4
V
(p2E + p
2
V )
Λπ > 0. To see that the eﬀect of pV on d∗
is ambiguous, note that
dd∗
dpV
=
1
1− s
duE
dpV
as before. We have
duE
dpV
=
∂uE
∂pV
+
∂uE
∂s∗
∂s∗
∂pV
+
∂uE
∂e∗
∂e∗
∂pV
+
∂uE
∂v∗
∂v∗
∂pV
. Using
∂uE
∂pV
= v∗π(Λ − λs) > 0, ∂uE
∂s∗
= −(a − d∗) − λpπ, ds
∗
dpV
=
Λ
λ
2pV p2E
(p2E + p
2
V )
> 0,
∂uE
∂e∗
= 0,
∂uE
∂v∗
= pV π(Λ − λs) and
dv∗
dpV
=
3p2V p
2
E + 5p
4
V
(p2E + p
2
V )
Λπ > 0 we
obtain
duE
dpV
= pV λs(Λ−λs)π2 −[a−d∗+λpπ]
Λ
λ
2pV p2E
(p2E + p
2
V )
+pV π(Λ−λs)
3p2V p
2
E + 5p
4
V
(p2E + p
2
V )
Λπ.
The second term is negative. Depending on the size of a, it might be bigger or smaller
than the sum of the first and third term. The reason for the ambiguity is that a higher
value of pV already requires a higher value of s (i.e. giving the venture capitalist more
equity). Whether it also requires a higher value of debt is ambiguous.
So far the wealth constraint was not binding. For the case where the wealth constraint
is binding we note that d∗ = a, so the only remaining issue is to verify that
dv∗
dpV
> 0
continues to hold. Using v∗ = pV πS∗, we have
dv∗
dpV
= πS∗ + pV π
dS∗
dpV
> 0 since
dS∗
dpV
> 0.
To see this last condition, we use uE(S, pV ) = kE to obtain
dS
dpV
=
duE
dpV
/(−duE
dS
). As before
we have
duE
dS
< 0, and it is immediate from the expressions in the proof of Proposition 1
that
duE
dpV
> 0. Hence
dS∗
dpV
> 0 and thus
dv∗
dpV
> 0.
The role of bargaining power
To see the importance of bargaining power, suppose instead that d∗ is determined by
the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where β measures the venture capitalist’s bar-
gaining power. The Nash solution maximizes uβV u
1−β
E , which yields after standard transfor-
mations the following first order condition: βuE−(1−β)uV = 0. Totally diﬀerentiating this
w.r.t. λ and d∗ we obtain after further transformations
dd∗
dλ
=
1
1− s [β
duE
dλ
− (1−β)duV
dλ
].
For β = 1 we regain the above framework. For β < 1, we also have to take
duV
dλ
into ac-
count. We have
duV
dλ
=
∂uV
∂λ
+
∂uV
∂s∗
∂s∗
∂λ
+
∂uV
∂e∗
∂e∗
∂λ
+
∂uV
∂v∗
∂v∗
∂λ
. Using
∂uV
∂λ
= pπs,
∂uV
∂s∗
=
(a−d∗)+pπλ, ds
∗
dλ
= − p
2
V
p2E + p
2
V
1− φ
λ2
= −s∗1− φ
λΛ
,
∂uV
∂e∗
= pEπλs,
∂e∗
∂λ
=
p3E
p2E + p
2
V
φπ and
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∂uV
∂v∗
= 0 we obtain
duV
dλ
= pπs∗−(a−d∗)s∗ 1− φ
λΛ
−pπs∗1− φ
Λ
+λs∗
p4E
p2E + p
2
V
φπ2, which we
can rewrite as
duV
dλ
= pπs∗
φλ
Λ
−(a−d∗)s∗ 1− φ
λΛ
+λs∗
p4E
p2E + p
2
V
φπ2. The first and third term
are positive, but the second term is negative. Let A = p
φ
1− φπλ
2 +
p4E
p2E + p
2
V
φ
1− φπ
2λ2Λ,
then
duV
dλ
< 0 whenever a− d∗ > A, which is equivalent to d∗ < a− A. If this condition
holds, then we always have β
duE
dλ
− (1−β)duV
dλ
> 0 and thus
dd∗
dλ
> 0 continues to apply.
For d∗ > a−A, however, there exists bβ, so that dd∗
dλ
> 0 requires β > bβ. For d∗ > a−A
and β < bβ, we obtain dd∗
dλ
< 0.
The intuition for why d∗ is mostly increasing in λ is as follows. Higher λ reduces
ineﬃcient loss of value due to stealing. From Lemma 1, higher values of λ decrease s∗. A
higher value of λ will thus always benefit the entrepreneur, i.e.,
duE
dλ
> 0. If d∗ is small,
then a−d∗ is large, so that a higher value of λ hurts the venture capitalist, because of the
lower equity share s∗. In this case we have
duV
dλ
< 0, and the sign of
dd∗
dλ
is unambiguous.
But for large values of d∗, the lower equity stake does not hurt the venture capitalist,
so that
duV
dλ
> 0. In this case,
dd∗
dλ
depends on relative bargaining power. If the venture
capitalist has low bargaining power (β < bβ), then the entrepreneur takes more of the debt,
since the venture capitalist’s required returns are already met by the increase in λ. But if
the venture capitalist has more bargaining power (β > bβ), then he can extract the benefits
of a better legal system through higher debt levels.
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Variable definitions
Variable definitions: (a) Dependent variables
Variable Description
INTERACTION ordered categorical variable that takes the values 1 to 4 if the
venture firm interacts with the portfolio company monthly,
weekly, quarterly, and annually.
DOWNSIDE dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the the finacing in-
struments used for the deal include straight debt, convertible
debt, or preferred equity; 0 otherwise.
DEBT dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal includes
straight debt; 0 otherwise.
CONVERTIBLE dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal includes
PREFERRED convertible debt or preferred equity; 0 otherwise.
EQUITY dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the deal includes
convertible debt or common equity; 0 otherwise.
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Variable definitions: (b) Independent variables: Legal systems
Variable Description
COMPANY—COMMON dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is
located in a legal system of common law, from Laporta et
al. (1998); 0 otherwise.
COMPANY—RULE measure of the quality of enforcement of legal rules in the
country of the portfolio company; based on an on an index
ranging from —2.5 to 2.5 developed by the World Bank and
described in Kaufmann et al. (2002).
COMPANY—PROCEDURAL measure of the degree of legal formalism of the legal system
of the portfolio company; based on an index ranging from 0
to 100, from the World Bank Doing Business database for
the year 2000. Rescaled by subtracting the original value
from 100, so that a higher value corresponds to a less formal
(i.e., better) legal system.
INVESTOR—COMMON dummy variable equal to 1 if the venture investor is located
in a legal system of common law and the portfolio company
in a legal system of civil law; 0 otherwise.
INVESTOR—RULE measure of the quality of enforcement of legal rules in the
country of the venture investor; based on an on an index
ranging from —2.5 to 2.5 developed by the World Bank and
described in Kaufmann et al. (2002).
INVESTOR—PROCEDURAL measure of the degree of legal formalism of the legal system
of the venture investor; based on an index ranging from 0 to
100, from the World Bank Doing Business database for the
year 2000. Rescaled by subtracting the original value from
100, so that a higher value corresponds to a less formal (i.e.,
better) legal system.
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Variable definitions: (c) Independent variables: investor—level and deal level
controls
Variable Description
INDEPENDENTVC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital-
ist defines itself as an independent venture firm; 0 otherwise.
VC—SIZE is the amount under management at the venture capital firm.
VC—AGE is the age of the venture capital firm, measured in months
at the end of the sample period.
VC-US-EXPERIENCE s a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the venture capital
firm has invested in at leaset one US company.
INTERNATIONALVC is the share of a venture capital firm’s investments made
abroad
PARTNER is the fraction of the venture firm’s partners with prior
US-EXPERIENCE experience in US venture capital
PARTNER is the fraction of the venture firm’s partners who have prior
BUSINESS-EXPERIENCE business experience in industry or consulting
STAGE ordered dummy variable that takes the values 1 to 4 if a deal
is reported as a seed, start-up, expansion, or bridge.
INDUSTRY set of a mutually exclusive dummy variables that take the
value 1 if the company is reported to operate in one the
following industries Biotech and pharma; Medical products;
Software and internet; Financial services; Industrial services;
Electronics; Consumer services; Telecom; Food and con-
sumer goods; Industrial products (incl. energy); Media &
Entertainment; Other; 0 otherwise.
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